think that the meaning (or content) of an indexical depends on the circumstances of its utterance. So, it may appear that semantics needs to refer to utterances.
Below, I consider various arguments for and against including utterances in semantics. Some of these arguments may be familiar; others may not. In the end, I conclude that utterance-semantics is viable, but must incorporate a rather surprising view of linguistic meaning in order to avoid serious objections. The most serious objections concern (a) expressions that are metaphysically impossible to utter and (b) synonymous simple expressions.1 The view of linguistic meaning needed by utterance-semantics brings it closer to expression-semantics than one might expect.
Linguistic Expressions, Utterances, Contexts, and Contents
Utterances are acts in which an agent utters a linguistic expression. So utterances are events of a certain sort. Utterances, like other events, occur at times and locations. Linguistic expressions, by contrast, are neither actions nor events. They either have no times and locations (if they are completely abstract entities) or they have times and locations that are distinct from those of their utterances.2 For example, some utterances of 'I' occurred entirely during the 4th of July 2015 in Cleveland, but the word 'I' itself does not occur, or exist, entirely within that time and location. Thus, each utterance of a linguistic expression is distinct from that linguistic expression. (Some philosophers seemingly take utterances to be tokens of expressions, rather than actions or events. I discuss the contrast between utterances and tokens in section 6.2. But notice that tokens of expressions are also distinct from expressions.) I will initially take a semantic theory to be an utterance theory iff, roughly, (a) it attributes paradigmatic semantic properties, such as referring, having a content, and being true, to utterances and (b) it takes linguistic meanings of expressions to be functions from utterances to contents, or relations between
